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I. INTRODUCTION
For over twenty-five years American courts have wrestled with
the status to be afforded evidence of a plaintiff's nonuse of an
available seatbelt in personal injury actions arising from motor ve-
hicle accidents.' Two factors have been largely responsible for the
increasing acceptance of the so-called "seatbelt defense" by state
judiciaries. The first factor contributing to the erosion of the early
reluctance of some state courts to recognize the seatbelt defense has
been the ever-increasing public recognition of the safety advantages
of seatbelt use.2 This is both apparent from and a product of the
1. The first reported recognition of the seatbelt defense by an American court occurred in
Slockinger v. Dunish (Sheboygan County, Wis. Cir. Ct. 1964). See Note, The Seatbelt Defense: A
Comprehensive Guide for the Trial Lawyer and Suggested Approach for the Courts, 56 NoTR DARE
L. Re. 272, 272 n.2 (1980) [hereinafter Note, Comprehensive Guide].
2. 3 AM. JuR. PROOF OF FACTS 3D 71, 79 (1989). See also Amend v. Bell, 89 Wash. 2d 124,
570 P.2d 138 (1977).
1
Coleman: Wright v. Hanley: No Seatbelt Defense under West Virginia Tort La
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1991
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
enactment -of state and federal regulations mandating the use3 and
installation 4 of safety restraints in passenger vehicles.
A second important factor which has contributed to the increas-
ing adoption of the seatbelt defense has been the almost total aban-
donment of the common law doctrine of contributory negligence.
Today, an overwhelming majority of states have adopted some form
of comparative negligence. 6
The seatbelt defense is not so much a rule of law but rather a
rule on the admissibility of evidence.7 Generally, defense counsel
have attempted to introduce evidence of a plaintiff's nonuse of an
available seatbelt to show comparative or contributory negligence
on the plaintiff's part,8 or to argue that the plaintiff had failed to
mitigate damages9 or both. 10 Aside from certain procedural aspects,
the actual recoveries for similarly situated plaintiffs should be the
same whether such evidence is used to determine a plaintiff's per-
centage of fault, or whether it is admitted to show a failure to
mitigate."
The negligence aspect of the seatbelt defense centers around the
argument that the plaintiff's failure to use an available seatbelt could
be judged by the finder of fact as a failure to exercise the care of
a reasonably prudent person under the circumstances. 2 Accordingly,
it is argued that such evidence should go to the jury in its deter-
mination of the plaintiff's responsibility for her own injuries.13 The
plaintiff's recovery is offset by the percentage of fault for her in-
juries attributable to her nonuse of an available seatbelt.14
3. E.g., W. VA. CODE § 17C-15-46 (1986) (mandating safety restraint use for all children under
nine); N.Y. VH. & TRA. § 1229-c (McKinney 1986) (mandating safety restraint use for all children
and front seat occupants).
4. E.g., W. VA. CODE § 17C-15-43 (1986) (requiring all automobiles to be equipped with
seatbelts); 49 C.F.R. § 571.208 (1989) (occupant crash protection regulations).
5. See Swajian v. General Motors Corp., 559 A.2d 1041, 1043 (R.I. 1989).
6. W. PRossER & W. KE oN, TBE LAw ON TORTS, § 67, (5th ed. 1984).
7. 35 Am. JuR. Tamis 362, 408 (1987).
8. See Bentzler v. Braun, 34 Wis. 2d 362, 149 N.W.2d 626 (1967).
9. See State v. Ingram, 427 N.E.2d 444 (Ind. 1981).
10. See Keaton v. Pearson, 292 S.C. 579, 358 S.E.2d 141 (1987).
11. 35 AM. JuR. TRIAis, supra note 7, at 415.
12. Dahl v. BMW, 304 Or. 558, 565, 748 P.2d 77, 81 (1987).
13. Id.
14. See id.
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The second commonly proffered version of the seatbelt defense
involves the failure to mitigate injuries.1 5 Under this approach, the
defendant argues that evidence of seatbelt nonuse should be ad-
missible at trial on the issue of whether the plaintiff failed in his
duty to mitigate hig own damages by not wearing an available seat-
belt. 16 The rule which requires an individual to take reasonable steps
to mitigate his own injuries is commonly equated to the doctrine of
avoidable consequences. 17
Both the comparative negligence and the mitigation theories of
the seatbelt defense place an affirmative duty on the defendant to
show that the plaintiff was not using an available and functioning
seatbelt at the time of the accident. 8 Furthermore, the defendant
must demonstrate a causal relationship between the plaintiff's non-
use of an available seatbelt and some or all of the plaintiff's in-
juries.1 9 This proof requires the introduction of expert testimony at
trial.20
Many jurisdictions have been slow to accept either version of
the seatbelt defense due to the perceived resistance of the American
public to utilize seatbelts as a part of their everyday travel.21 The
acceptance, however, of the comparative negligence theory with its
focus on the relative fault of the parties, 2 coupled with changing
American attitudes toward seatbelt use, 3 has provided a major im-
petus for the increasing acceptance of the seatbelt defense through-
15. See Waterson v. General Motors Corp., 111 N.J. 238, 263, 544 A.2d 357, 370 (1988). See
also 3 AM. Ju. PROOF OF FACTS 3D, supra note 2, at 79.
16. See 3 AM. Jui. PROOF OF FACTS 3D, supra note 2, at 79.
17. See Foley v. City of West Allis, 113 Wis. 2d 475, 335 N.W.2d 824 (1984). See generally
W. PROSSER & W. KEEToN, supra note 6, § 65.
18. 3 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FAcTs 3D, supra note 2, at 87-88.
19. Id. at 89.
20. Id. at 90.
21. See Miller v. Miller, 273 N.C. 228, 238, 160 S.E.2d 65, 73 (1968) ("The scant use which
average motorist makes of his seat belt ... indicates that court should not impose a duty ... to
use them .... "). But see Hutchins v. Schwartz, 724 P.2d 1194, 1198 (Alaska 1986) ("[Ihe fact
that a majority of people act in a certain manner does not make that conduct reasonable .... ").
22. See generally Bradley v. Appalachian Power Co., 163 W. Va. 332, 256 S.E.2d 879 (1979)
(explaining comparative negligence).
23. 3 AM. Jus. PROOF OF FACTS 3D, supra note 2, at 79.
1991]
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out the United States.24 The public's attitude toward seatbelts has
been influenced a great deal by the increasing irrefutability of sci-
entific evidence as to the efficacy of seatbelts in improving accident
survivability.2
The seatbelt defense has engendered a wide range of justifications
for both its adoption and rejection by state courts throughout the
country. 26 This divisiveness of opinion demonstrates the difficulty
courts have had in adapting the seatbelt defense to traditional views
of causation and fairness. 27 In recent years this question has been
answered for many courts by the majority of state legislatures which
have adopted mandatory seatbelt use laws.28 These statutes typically
permit 29 or exclude30 the evidence of violations in civil trials. Some
of these laws specifically limit the percentage by which a plaintiff's
recovery can be reduced for failure to wear a seatbelt a.3
This Note begins with an overview of the arguments which have
been advanced for and against the adoption of the seatbelt defense.
The focus then shifts to an evaluation of the West Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals decision in Wright v. Hanley.2 Wright marked
the first time in which the court was faced. with the question of
whether evidence of a plaintiff's nonuse of an available seatbelt was
admissible in a personal injury action in West Virginia.33
24. Waterson v. General Motors Corp., 111 N.J. 238, 263, 544 A.2d 357, 370 ("the more recent
cases overwhelmingly adopt some variation [of the seatbelt defense]").
25. See Motor Vehicle Mfr. Ass'n v. State Farm Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983).
26. Compare Insurance Co. of North America v. Pasakarnis, 451 So. 2d 447 (Fla. 1984) (fas-
tening a seatbelt requires "minimal effort") and Bentzler, 149 N.W.2d 626 (finding a common law
duty to buckle up) with Clarkson v. Wright, 108 Il. 2d 129, 483 N.E.2d 268 (1985) (holding that
there is no duty to anticipate defendant's negligence) and Ingram, 427 N.E.2d 444 (Ind. 1981) (mit-
igation is strictly a post-accident duty).
27. See Westenberg, The Safety Belt Defense at Trial and in Out-of-Court Settlement, 37 U.
FiA. L. Rnv. 785, 788 (1985) ("The safety belt defense does not conform readily with ... traditional
tort doctrines...").
28. Id. at 801.
29. E.g., FIA. STAT. ANN. § 316.613 (West Supp. 1989).
30. E.g., CAL. VEH. CODE § 27315(i) (Deering Supp. 1990).
31. E.g., MICH. STAT. ANN. § 9.2410(5) (1989) (5% limitation on damage reduction).
32. 387 S.E.2d 801 (W. Va. 1989).
33. But cf. State v. Nester, 336 S.E.2d 187 (W. Va. 1985) (holding that the failure to wear a
seatbelt was not an intervening cause of victim's death due to drunk driving).
[Vol. 93
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II. ARGUMENTS FAVORING THE SEATBELT DEFENSE
The following discussion focuses on some of the justifications
which have been raised by defense counsel, judges, and legal scholars
in favor of the recognition of the seatbelt defense in personal injury
actions. Because many of these arguments are based upon the rea-
sonableness of the plaintiff's failure to wear an available seatbelt,
they are interrelated in some ways.
A. The Admissibility of Seatbelt Evidence
The near total abandonment of the common law rule of con-
tributory negligence by the majority of states34 demonstrates a desire
by lawmakers and judges to do away with the all-or-nothing harsh-
ness of the old common law rule and replace it with a rule of law
which more fairly apportions responsibility according to the relative
fault of the parties. 35 This argument in favor of the admissibility of
seatbelt evidence premises findings of fault based upon each party's
causal responsibility for the plaintiff's injuries rather than their causal
connection to the injury-producing event.36
The position that seatbelt evidence should be admissible to prop-
erly assess each party's responsibility for the resultant injuries finds
some support in Justice Miller's opinion in Bradley v. Appalachian
Power Co. ,37 in which the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals
first adopted the doctrine of comparative negligence. 38 In his dis-
cussion on proximate cause under the new standard, Justice Miller
stated that:
before any party is entitled to recover it must be shown that the negligence of
the defendant was the proximate cause of the accident and subsequent injuries.
The same is true of contributory fault or negligence. Before it can be counted
34. W. PROSSER & W. K ETON, supra note 6.
35. See Clarkson v. Wright, 108 Ill. 2d 129, 134, 483, N.E.2d 268, 270 (1985) (Ryan J., dis-
senting).
36. See Hoglund & Parsons, Caveat Viator: The Duty to Wear Seatbelts Under Comparative
Negligence Law, 50 WASH. L. Rav. 1, 14-15 (1974). See also REsTATEMENT (SECoND) OF ToRTS §
433A, comment c (1966).
37. 163 W. Va. 332, 256 S.E.2d 879 (1979).
38. Id.
1991]
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against a plaintiff, it must be found to be the proximate cause of his injuries.
(emphasis added)"
The acceptance of seatbelt evidence in a "modified" comparative
negligence jurisdiction, 4° such as West Virginia, requires the finder
of fact to adopt a schizophrenic view of proximate cause. This is
because evidence of seatbelt nonuse is considered irrelevant in as-
sessing fault for the accident;4' such evidence, however, is crucial
to determining responsibility for the injuries which resulted. 42
B. Reasonable Care
The second justification often advanced in favor of the seatbelt
defense is the plaintiff's duty to exercise the ordinary care of a
reasonably prudent person under the circumstances. 43 This duty ap-
plies to taking steps to ensure one's own safety from unreasonable
yet foreseeable dangers."
Under this due care approach to the seatbelt defense, it is argued
that, given the inherent dangers of travelling in automobiles45 and
the availability4" and effectiveness of a safety belt in reducing the
harm which could result from a traffic accident, 47 a finder of fact
could conclude that under the circumstances it would be unreason-
able for a plaintiff not to have utilized an available seatbelt. 48 This
view, like the first, places a premium on allowing the jury to de-
termine the weight to be given to certain facts in judging the re-
sponsibility of the parties, "rather than preventing the relevancy of
such evidence from ever being considered due to some prophylactic
bar on its admission." '49
39. Id.
40. See generally 256 S.E.2d 879 (1979).
41. Waterson v. General Motors Corp., N.J. 238, 264, 544 A.2d 357, 370 (1988).
42. Id.
43. See Insurance Co. of North American v. Pasakarnis, 451 So. 2d 447 (Fla. 1984).
44. See Note, Comprehensive Guide, supra note 1, at 280.
45. NATIONAL SAFETY CouNcrL, AccmENT FACTS, 63 (1985) [hereinafter ACCIDBNT FAcTs].
46. See 35 AM. JUR. TRmALS, supra note 7, 349, 362 n.4 (more than 95% of all passenger
vehicles equipped with seatbelts).
47. Id. at 362.
48. Pasakarnis, 451 So. 2d at 453.
49. See id. at 454.
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C. Reasonably Avoidable Damages
This approach looks to whether it is fair to require a defendant,
whose negligence may only be slight, to compensate for possibly
astronomical injuries, most, if not all, of which could have been
avoided had the plaintiff bothered "to expend the minimal effort
required to fasten an available seatbelt. ' ' 50 This fairness argument
is inherent in the mitigation theory of the seatbelt defense. Under
the mitigation doctrine, the plaintiff cannot recover for any injuries
which could have been avoided if reasonable steps had been taken."
The life-threatening dangers inherent in automotive travel are
now common knowledge.5 2 The defendant should not be made to
suffer for the plaintiff's "never-happen-to-me" attitude. To believe
that "the chance of being involved in an injury-producing accident
is relatively low"' 53 each time one gets into an automobile obviously
ignores reality.
D. Obligation To Wear Seatbelts
Under a more utilitarian view of the seatbelt defense, it is argued
that in the absence of legislation creating an affirmative duty to
wear an available seatbelt, the courts should create such a duty as
a matter of public policy. 54 Thousands of persons are killed annually
and millions more are injured as a result of motor vehicle accidents.55
These facts, when coupled with the overwhelming body of scientific
evidence showing that an extraordinary number of these deaths and
injuries could be averted through the proper use of seatbelts,5 6 pro-
vide a convincing argument that the public good demands that we
all subject ourselves to the arguable inconvenience of buckling up
whenever we travel in an automobile.57
50. Id. at 453 (quoting Insurance Co. of North America v. Pasakarnis, 425 So. 2d 1141 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1982)) (Schwartz, J., dissenting).
51. Welsh v. Anderson, 228 Neb. 79, 421 N.W.2d 426 (1988).
52. See AcCMENT FAcTs, supra note 45, at 45.
53. Miller v. Miller, 273 N.C. 228, 231, 160 S.E.2d 65, 68 (1968).
54. See Note, Comprehensive Guide, supra note 1, at 283.
55. AcCMENT FAcTs, supra note 45, at 45.
56. Id. at 53.
57. But see, Amend v. Bell, 89 Wash. 2d 124, 570 P.2d 138 (1977).
1991]
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The importance of seatbelt use as a matter of public policy is
reflected in legislation mandating the installation of seatbelts in all
passenger vehicles.5 8 Similarly, laws requiring that all infants be re-
strained while travelling shows the important public concern for the
use of safety restraints in automobiles.59 The introduction of seatbelt
evidence in civil trials would lead to an increased use of available
seatbelts by the general public within the state; mandatory seatbelt
use legislation appears to have had this effect. 60
E. Per Se Negligent Behavior
A final argument for the seatbelt defense, which applies only to
those states with seatbelt laws which are silent as to the effect of
evidence of a criminal violation introduced during a civil trial,6' is
that the seatbelt defense comports well with the common law notion
that the standard of conduct of a reasonably prudent person may
be prescribed by legislation.62 Consequently, in these few states, a
violation of a mandatory seatbelt use law can logically be viewed as
negligence per se.6s At the very least, a violation should be evidence
of negligence on the plaintiff's part. 64 This view is particularly con-
vincing when it is shown that the violation of the statute proximately
caused or aggravated the injuries received by the plaintiff.6s
III. ARGUMENTS DIsFAvoRING THE SEATBELT DEFENSE
The following discussion is devoted to the arguments which have
been advanced against the adoption of the seatbelt defense. A careful
observation will reveal that some of these justifications are merely
twists on the premises used to extol the virtues of the seatbelt de-
fense.
58. See e.g., W. VA. CODE § 17C-15-43 (1986).
59. See e.g., id. § 17C-15-46 (1986).
60. 3 AM. JUi. PROOF OF FACTS 3D, supra note 2, at 96.
61. E.g., N.J. REv. STAT. § 39:3-76.2a (1988) (child restraints).
62. W. PROSSER & W. K=oN, supra note 6, § 36, at 220.
63. Id. at 230.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 225.
[Vol. 93
8
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 93, Iss. 2 [1991], Art. 4
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss2/4
SEA TBEL T DEFENSE
A. The Plaintiff in No Way Caused the Accident
One strong argument which dictates against the adoption of the
seatbelt defense is that it reduces all or part of a plaintiff's recovery
on the basis of an omission which in no way contributes to the
occurrence of the injury-producing event. 66 One can envision a sit-
uation in which a seriously injured plaintiff is left with little or no
relief because a negligent defendant successfully demonstrates,
through expert testimony, that the plaintiff would have received little
or no injuries had she been wearing an available seatbelt. This result
seems'unfair even if one concedes that the failure to wear a seatbelt.
Clearly the defendant's active negligence is much more responsible
for the plaintiff's plight. 67
The preceding scenario, which seems entirely plausible in a seat-
belt defense jurisdiction, illustrates the problem with a scheme which
measures liability according to each party's responsibility for the
resulting injuries rather than for the injury-producing event. 6 The
failure to fasten a seatbelt alone could not prove injurious to a
plaintiff.69 At most, one could say that the plaintiff had increased
the likelihood of receiving more serious injuries from the defendant's
negligent behavior.7 0
B. No Duty to Mitigate Damages
Under the doctrines of avoidable consequences and mitigation
of damages a plaintiff has no right to recover for any injuries which
she could have reasonably avoided following the defendant's legal
wrong.7 1 Since the plaintiff's failure to fasten an available seatbelt
must occur prior to the accident, then the admission of seatbelt
evidence cannot properly be admitted to show a failure on the plain-
tiff's part to mitigate his injuries. 72
66. Note, Comprehensive Guide, supra note 1, at 284.
67. See id.
68. See Morast v. James, 87 Or. App. 368, 742 P.2d 666 (1987).
69. Note, Comprehensive Guide, supra note 1, at 284.
70. Clarkson v. Wright, 108 I1. 2d 129, 132, 483 N.E.2d 268, 269 (1985).
71. Welsh v. Anderson, 228 Neb. 79, 82, 421 N.W.2d 426, 428 (1988).
72. Id. at 429.
1991]
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Some courts have argued that such a rule would amount to a
requirement that the plaintiff anticipate and guard against the de-
fendant's wrong.7 3 This is contrary to the traditional common law
view that one can expect others to take reasonable care when driving.7 4
Consequently, the plaintiff's nonuse of an available seatbelt could
not constitute a failure to mitigate damages.7 5
In response, however, a few courts have questioned the continued
validity of the view of the avoidance of negligent harm as a strictly
post-accident duty.76 Under the common law, one's pre-accident con-
duct was judged under the rule of contributory negligence, 77 whereas
one's post-accident duty was guided by the rule of avoidable con-
sequences.78 Therefore, it is argued that this doctrine of contributory
negligence has been almost completely discarded.7 9
C. Undue Burden and Prejudice
The introduction of the seatbelt defense would lead to a "battle
of the experts" on the causal relationship between the plaintiff's
injuries and the failure to wear a seatbelt 0 It has been argued that
such evidence is too speculative to aid the fact-finder in rendering
a fair judgement.8' Seatbelt evidence would burden an already cum-
bersome process8 2 and invite jurors to render verdicts based on pas-
sions and prejudices. 3 Such testimony better enables a jury to find
in favor of a more sympathetic yet clearly negligent defendant.14
73. Amend v. Bell, 89 Wash. 2d 124, 570 P.2d 138 (1977).
74. Id.
75. See Clarkson v. Wright, 108 I1. 2d 129, 483 N.E.2d 268; (1985) State v. Ingram, 427 N.E.
444 (Ind. 1981); Welsh v. Anderson, 228 Neb. 79, 421 N.W.2d 426 (1977); Miller v. Miller, 273 N.C.
228, 160 S.E.2d 65 (1968); Amend v. Bell, 89 Wash. 2d 124, 570 P.2d 138 (1977).
76. See Law v. Superior Court, 157 Ariz. 142, 755 P.2d 1130 (1986); Clarkson, 108 Ill. 2d at
137, 483 N.E.2d at 272 (Ryan, J., dissenting).
77. See Clarkson, 108 Il. 2d at 137, 483 N.E.2d at 272 (Ryan, J., dissenting).
78. Id.
79. See id.
80. Amend, 89 Wash. 2d at 133, 570 P.2d at 143.
81. Miller, 273 N.C. at 238, 160 S.E.2d at 70.
82. See Westenberg, supra note 27, at 789.
83. Lipscomb v. Diamiani, 226 A.2d 914, 917 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1967).
84. See id.
[Vol. 93
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In addition, the standard of reasonable care under the circum-
stances gives the jury little guidance in determining whether a plain-
tiff was negligent for failing to wear a seatbelt. 85 While this argument
may have some merit, it seems that it could as easily be applied to
a great deal of the fact-finding which takes place in civil litigation.
D. No Duty to Wear a Seatbelt
Another strength of nonrecognition of the seatbelt defense is that
absent a mandatory seatbelt use law it can be argued that one is
under no duty to wear a seatbelt.86 Whether such a duty should exist
is a decision better left to the legislative and executive branches of
the state. 87 Since the state legislature is empowered to mandate the
use of seatbelts,8 8 its failure to do so should be respected by the
courts.8 9 The view that the judiciary should defer to the legislature
on the question of whether there exists a duty to wear an available
seatbelt was adopted by the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals
in Wright v. Hanley.90
IV. Tm FAcTs oF WRrHTI v. HANLEY
The dispute in question arose out of a traffic accident which
occurred in Wheeling, West Virginia in 1983. The accident involved
separate cars operated by the plaintiff, Wright, and defendant,
Hanley.91 Wright's two children were passengers in his car at the
time of the collision. 92 The plaintiff brought an action in the circuit
court to recover for the injuries he and his children sustained.93
At trial each party claimed that the other had run a red light
at the intersection where the accident had taken place. 94 The evidence
85. Id.
86. Keaton v. Pearson, 292 S.C. 579, 358 S.E.2d 141 (1987).
87. Id.
88. See 3 AM. JuR. PROOF OF FACTS 3D, supra note 2, § 3.
89. See Pearson, 358 S.E.2d 141.
90. Wright v. Hanley, 387 S.E.2d 801 (W. Va. 1989).
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
1991]
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adduced at trial showed that neither the plaintiff nor his children
were wearing seatbelts at the time of the accident. 95 It is uncertain
from the court's opinion whether or not the plaintiff objected to
the introduction of this evidence at trial.96 The jury found the plain-
tiff fifty-one percent causally responsible for the accident, and ac-
cordingly, Wright was denied any recovery under West Virginia's
comparative negligence formula.97
Wright's sole contention on appeal was that the circuit court
judge gave the jury the following seatbelt instruction in error:
You are instructed that Dennis Wright had a duty to exercise due care for his
own safety. There has been testimony in this case that Mr. Wright's car was
equipped with a seatbelt, which he was not using at the time.
If you believe that the failure of Mr. Wright to wear his safety belt was a negligent
act on his part and further, if you believe that failure to wear a safety belt
proximately caused or contributed to Mr. Wright's injuries, then you may consider
this act of negligence as a factor in determining the amount of damages, if any,
to be awarded to Mr. Wright and as a factor in assessing fault for the collision.
(emphasis added)
The court must caution the jury that the failure to wear seatbelts in no way
affects the amount of damages which may be recovered by Lee and Gladys Wright."
V. THE COURT's DECISION AND RATIONALE
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, in an opinion
authored by Justice Workman, unanimously reversed the lower court
on the grounds that there exists no duty upon a motor vehicle pas-
senger to wear an available seatbelt, absent legislation to the con-
trary.99 Justice Workman divided her discussion on seatbelt usage
into two main parts. The first part discussed whether there was a
duty in West Virginia to wear a seatbelt'00 while the second part of
the opinion focused on whether evidence of seatbelt nonuse could
be admitted to show that the plaintiffs had failed to mitigate their
damages. 101
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 802.
99. Id. at 801.
100. Id. at 802-03.
101. Id. at 803-04.
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12
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 93, Iss. 2 [1991], Art. 4
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss2/4
SEA TBEL T DEFENSE
The Wright court first noted that while automotive vehicles in
West Virginia must be equipped with safety belts, 10 2 there is no stat-
utory duty upon an individual to actually use one. 03 Acknowledging
that a few courts have found that a duty to wear a seatbelt existed
under the common law standard of ordinary care,' ° the court looked
to whether such a common law duty existed in West Virginia. Justice
Workman quoted from the decision in Miller v. Miller,0 5 in which
the North Carolina Supreme Court held that no duty existed under
the common law to wear a seatbelt and that consequently such ev-
idence was inadmissible at trial. °0 The West Virginia Supreme Court's
opinion appropriated language from Miller which questioned the
efficacy of the reasonable person standard in determining whether
the failure to wear a seatbelt is a negligent act. 0 7
In a footnote to its discussion on whether or not there existed
a duty to wear an available seatbelt, the Wright court noted that
West Virginia's governor had, only the year before, vetoed a man-
datory seatbelt law passed by the legislature, which explicitly ex-
cluded the admissibility of violations from civil trials. 0 8 The court
concluded this portion of its analysis by "refrain[ing] from imposing
a standard of conduct that the legislature has thus far been unsuc-
cessful in imposing."' 9
The Wright court gave similar treatment to the question of
whether seatbelt evidence could be used to show a failure to mitigate
damages." 0 The court quoted language from State v. Ingram"' which
held that failing to buckle a seatbelt should not be considered under
a doctrine which imposed no duty on the plaintiff until after he had
been wronged by the defendant." 2 The court proceeded to quote
102. See W. VA. CODE § 17C-15-43 (1986).
103. Wright, 387 S.E.2d at 802-03.
104. Id. (citing Bentzler v. Braun, 34 Wis. 2d 362, 149 N.W.2d 626 (1967)).
105. 273 N.C. 228, 160 S.E.2d 65 (1968).
106. Id.
107. Wright, 387 $.E.2d at 803.
108. Id. n.6.
109. Id. at 803.
110. Id.
111. 427 N.E.2d 444 (Ind. 1981).
112. Id.
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from a few other decisions which raised concerns with the adoption
of a rule requiring individuals to mitigate their damages in advance
of the defendant's wrongdoing." 3
The court held that in the absence of a duty to wear a seatbelt
for one's own protection, the nonuse of a seatbelt could not be
advanced to prove a failure to mitigate." 4 The court concluded by
quoting language from Miller which argues that the seatbelt defense
would only lead to prejudicial and inconsistent verdicts." 5 Aside from
the fact that giving the seatbelt instruction constituted plain error,
the court also felt that the instruction may have confused the jury
in its determination of the parties' percentages of negligence." 6
VI. AN EVALUATION OF THE COURT'S OPINION
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals' decision that the
state legislature is the proper forum for the imposition of a duty
on individuals to wear seatbelts is a sound exercise of judicial re-
straint, especially when one considers the recent history of seatbelt
legislation in this state. An opposite ruling would in a certain respect
have been tantamount to an overriding of the governor's veto, some-
thing the legislature was unable to do. The court, by its ruling in
Wright understandably wants to avoid the impression that it is taking
sides on an issue on which the legislative and executive branches
had only recently sparred.
One likes to believe that if the majoritarian processes in the state
are truly functional, and the citizens of West Virginia truly desire
a seatbelt law, then the state legislature, emboldened by the election
of a new governor who shares party affiliation with the overwhelm-
ing majority of the members, will attempt anew to enact a man-
datory seatbelt use law. A decision by the Wright court imposing
a duty to wear a seatbelt could possibly have stifled any existing
legislative initiative in this area. Logic would seem to suggest that
a statutory pronouncement requiring West Virginians to buckle up,
113. Wright, 387 S.E.2d at 803-04.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
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coupled with appropriate fines for noncompliance, would be more
effective than a common law duty to do so.
Another justification for the court's deferential approach is that
the seatbelt defense is a tough issue which does not fit easily into
either the doctrines of comparative negligence or mitigation of dam-
ages. While each side can for different reasons claim that its view
is just, the court's ruling suggests that the fairest way to handle the
issue is to allow the citizens of West Virginia, through their elected
representatives, to decide for themselves.
While the result reached by the court in Wright is prudent, many
of the cases cited by Justice Workman in support of the court's
reasoning seemed to be lacking as a basis for the refusal to find a
seatbelt defense in West Virginia. One example is the court's ex-
traction of language from Miller in which the North Carolina Su-
preme Court refused to hold that the common law placed a duty
on individuals to wear seatbelts.1 7 The citing of this case is mis-
leading for a number of reasons. First of all, Miller is over twenty
years old and at least part of the court's reasoning in the case was
founded on now outdated premises, such as the idea that the "social
utility of wearing a seatbelt [had yet to] be established in the mind
of the public"' 18 and that some "researchers have reached the con-
clusion that the use of seatbelts is limited in value.""' 9
A second problem with the court relying on the Miller holding
is that it did not rule out the use of such evidence in all cases. In
his opinion for the North Carolina court, Justice Sharp said in dicta
that
[c]onceivably a situation could arise in which a plaintiff's failure to have his
seatbelt buckled at the time he was injured would constitute negligence. It would,
however, have to be a situation in which the plaintiff, with prior knowledge of
a specific hazard - one not generally associated with highway travel and one
which a seatbelt would have protected him - had failed or refused to fasten his
seatbelt.'20
117. Miller v. Miller, 273 N.C. 228, 160 S.E.2d 65 (1968).
118. Id. at 296.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 70.
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A final factor, which undermines the applicability of Miller to
the question of whether or not nonuse of a seatbelt can be evidence
of negligence in West Virginia, is that North Carolina continues to
adhere to the rule of contributory negligence.' 2 ' Accordingly, the
possibility of injustice resulting from a finding that seatbelt nonuse
constitutes negligence, in the jurisdiction in which Miller was de-
cided, is far greater than in West Virginia.
A case quoted by Justice Workman in her discussion on miti-
gation of damages, which is also only marginally supportive, is the
decision of the Oregon Court of Appeals in James v. Morast.22 In
Morast, the Oregon Court of Appeals reversed a lower court's ver-
dict in a suit over an automobile accident, on the grounds that it
was error for the court to instruct the jury that nonuse of an avail-
able seatbelt could be weighed as evidence of the plaintiff's failure
to mitigate. 23 This decision is of dubious value to the West Virginia
Supreme Court's ultimate holding in Wright because, although the
Oregon Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals,
it did so on different grounds.'2 The Oregon Supreme Court ruled
- in a companion case to its decision in James v. Morast - that
seatbelt evidence though inadmissible on the issue of mitigation of
damages was admissible as evidence of the plaintiff's comparative
negligence.' 25
VII. CONCLUSION
The West Virginia Court of Appeals' decision in Wright v. Han-
ley to defer to the legislature on the question of an individual's duty
to use an available seatbelt in the state, was the wisest course to
take. This is especially true when one considers the continuing public
discourse over mandatory seatbelt use legislation as well as the rel-
ative balance between the arguments for and against the seatbelt
defense. It would seem truly anti-majoritarian for the court to tip
the balance in this narrow debate. Perhaps it would have been better
121. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 6 § 67.
122. 87 Or. App. 368, 742 P.2d 665, aff'd on other grounds, 304 Or. 571, 748 P.2d 84 (1987).
123. Id.
124. Morast v. James, 304 Or. 571, 748 P.2d 84 (1987).
125. Dahi v. BMW, 304 Or. 558, 748 P.2d 77 (1987).
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had the court issued a short per curiam opinion rather than cite
language which, though seemingly supportive, came from cases which
add little credence to the court's larger decision that seatbelt evidence
is inadmissible in personal injury actions in West Virginia.
A truly ironic part of the whole debate over the seatbelt defense
is that the advances in scientific technology from which it arose will
probably someday make it an anachronism of tort law. With the
advent of passive safety-belts and airbags, the plaintiff's nonuse of
an available seatbelt may become a thing of the past.
D. Kevin Coleman
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